Anyone familiar with mcxlern industrial relations systems cannot help but notice that the beh a vior of employers in North America and Europe is quite different.
In Europe employers generally accept trade unions as legitimate and necessary institutions in democratic society. Rarely do they overtly attempt to dissuade employees from becoming union members. European employers have formed industrial associations and national federations which are recognized by society, government and organized labou� as the authoritative representatives of industry in regard to social and labour management affairs. Through either formal or informal mechanisms employer organizations commonly seek to reach national consensus with labour and government over major issues of common concern.
The North American situation is quite different. Employers typically pursue independent and uncoordinated objectives :i.n the social and labour arena. Although there are many national employers' organizations (e.g., The
Chambers of Commerce, The Canadian Manufacturers' Association, The U.S.
Business Roundtable, and the Canadian Business Council on National Issues) there are none with the membership density or authoratative stature in regard to social and labour issues comparable to their European counterparts. By and large North American employers grudgingly tolerate unions because they are a fact of life rather than because of any formal recognition that unions have a positive social role to play. Many North American employers hold that unions are unnecessary where management "does right willingly." It is quite common for employers to attempt to avoio un ionization. It is taken for granted that non-union employers will continually attempt to discourage employees from becoming union members and establishing collective bargaining. Because they have overtly hostile attitudes towards unions and because t_ �eir organizations are weak employers rarely join with unions and governments to reach national concensus over critical issues. Instead labour and management typically lobby hard for their own preferred policies which are of ten considered unacceptable and detrimental to t_ �e other side.
These observed differences might lead the casual observer to conclude that the basic attitudes or value systems of European and North American employers are fundamentally diverge i: t. The thesis of this paper is that the basic attitudes and values of employers on both sides of the Atlantic are
. essentially the same. The variance in observed behaviour is the result, not of und erlying attitudes, but rather of critical historical events and resultant differences in industrial relations systems.
Early Response of Employers to Unions
The commonality of employer attitudes in regard to trade unions is indicated by their initial reaction to the emergence of the labour movement. Everywhere the first response of employers was to destroy or contain the unions. In I-nth
Europe and North America one may find examples of some combination of the following tactics being put to use against union organization:
1.
2.
Victimization:
sentiments.
the dismissal of workers suspected of union Yellow dog contracts: requiring workers to sign individual contracts stating that they were not trade unionists and would not become trade unionists.
3.
Company or yellow unions: encouraging pacific employe e organizations designerl to reduce the attraction of "free" unions.
4.
Blacklists: the distribution of the names of workers suspected to be union organizers and the subsequent refusal of employers to hire people on the list.
5.
Refusal to negotiate with worker representatives.
6.
The use of strikebreakers, lockouts an<1 strike insurance to counteract strikes, the primary basis of union pJwer.
To the continental employer, accorfl.ing to Landes, "a union was a conspiracy against public order and morals; a strike an act of ingratitude;
the effort of labour to raise wages the indiscipline of an impatient son. All of this was evil. And there is no negotiating with evil.11 1
In Germany typical practices of early employers were "the blacklisting of strikers and the supplying of strikebreakers, the operation of employment off ices, propaganda on behalf of the employer viewpoint during labor disputes, and the promotion of legislation favorable to the employer." Employers also encouraged the development of "yellow" or company unions which by World War I had a large membership. 2
Common devices use<'! in France were "Blacklists, firing of unionists, lockouts, agents provacateurs, and spies." Company unions were also prominent in the first decade of the twentieth century. 3
In Britain an employers' association in the engineering industry agreed, in t.he 1850's, to the following rules:
No meml.;er would employ a trade unionist All of the tactics noted above were in common use in the U.S. and Cana<la.
In the infamous "M ohawk Valley Formula" employers consciously combiner1 the entire range of anti-union tactics to fight t. he surge of unionism. Table 3 Number of Industrial Disputes In such an environment employers began to realize that the tactics of overt beligerance were likely to be counterproductive. Instead of containing unions, active opposition was more likely to produce increased government intervention. Moreover, given the political objectives of labour 1 employers had good reason to fear for the survival of the capitalist system itself. The idealistic political strategy of labour in Europe produced a threat not merely to individual employers but rather to employers as a class. Given the nature of this threat employers began to unite for, in the words of one contemporary observer, "sheer self-preservation. In return for union recognition employers received de facto acceptance of the legitimacy of capitalist enterprize. France and Italy were exceptions.
In those countries the mainstream of the labour movements clung to their radical objectives. Because they have done so, the efforts of government to bring abo ut stable labour-management relations have been less than successful.
Employers continue to complain that they cannot deal matter-of-factly with organizations whose avowed public goal is the destruction of capi talism. 14 To European employers generally recognition did not mean that they were prepared to fully share the power to manage. For the most part employers, through their associations, insisted that negotiations should take place on an area or industry rather than on a plant by plant basis. Some of the older craft unions opposen this bargaining structure but the wider-based unions generally approved it. By agreeing to multi-employer bargaining over basic terms and conditions of employment employers intended to maintain control over most managerial decisions. They continued to vigorously oppose any union presence in the enterprize. In some countries the association . Despite such statements British employers were not very successful in excluding union representatives from the enterprize. During World War I and again in the World War II and post war era strong shop stewards movements emerged. These informal organizations which were often separate from the union establishment did place serious constraints on managerial prerogatives.
They often hindered the implementation of new techniques and insisted that long established customs ana practices be respected. Their demands were supported by the use or threat of "wildcat, " "unconstitutional" or "unofficial" strikes. It is no coincidence that British employers have been more prone to fight unionization on a plant·by plant basis than other European employers.
In several countries where management was more successful in excluding unions from the enterprize the void in worker representation at the shop level was politically unacceptable. Works councils, established either through ---legislatio n or collective bargaining, were the usual compromise. To employers the councils were more acceptable than shop floor unions because they were composed of company employees rather than outsiders. In most cases the councils were provided with a productionist rather than a consumptionist mandate. They were also forbidden to negotiate collective agreements -a function which the unions insisted that they exclusively retain. Nor were the councils permitted to strike. Employers did not willingly accept the councils.
In many cases they fought vigorously against them. However, by holding out for no employee representation they achieved a compromise which was more acceptable than the alternative of union organization in the plant. From an employer's perspective the strategy was quite successful. For several decades the councils were to have very little influence on the power to manage. 1"7
With the establishment of multi-employer bargaining several countries passed extention of agreements legislation. These provisions allov1ed
negotiated terms to be extende<l to employers who were not party to the negotiations. They protected associated employers from low wage competition and provided the unions with a means of providing more universal benefits.
Since non-associated employers could be compelled to implement terms over which they had no control extension provisions encouraged the growth of employer associations.
In North America where extension provisions are all but non-existant most employer associations consist of small and weak firms.
In Europe, however, large employers who may influence association policy are more highly associated than are small firms. 18
After World War II new social issues came to the fore: reconstruction, inflation, wage and price controls, unemployment, active manpower planning, the quality of worklife, and new demands for workers participation in management. r.Jabour, management and the state all had strong interests in these issues and each party had organizations though which their interests could be pursued. Either formally or informally national decision-making in regard to employment related issues became tripartite.
Regardless of their level of membership density trade union federations The North American Pattern North American developments were quite different and as a result employers developed a distinctive strategy. In 1880's the mainstream of the lalx>r movement decided to limit itself to craft organization and emphasized economic action against employers over political action. Socialism was firmly rejected. Nor was there to be any alliance with a political party. As a result there was no serious political threat to capitalism. Employers did not have to seek public and union acceptance of capitalist enterprise. It was granted freely. Union leaders continually reaffirmed their acceptance of the capitalist system. Trade unionism did represent a challenge to management's power to manage but it was manifest as a threat to specific employers in I specific industries at specific times and places rather than as a general threat to employers as a class.
One might intuitively ex pect that employers would be more receptive to unions which pledged allegiance to the system hut quite the contrary occurred.
The moderation of th� labor movement led employers to believe that the unions could be destroyed or at least contained.
Where unions were able to compel companies to recognize and negotiate with them as a result of their market power they were also able to compel employers to sign collective agreements which over time became elaborated and made serious inroads into the rights of management. For example, unions imposed seniority provisions regarding layoffs and promotions, manning schedules and crew sizes, job descriptions and classifications, restrictions on the implementation of new technology or restrictions on the manpower consequences of technological change. There were mandatory union membership provisions and requirements that companies must use union labour. There were restrictions and requirements regarding training and overtime and the sub-contracting of work. The ability of management to impose discipline was constrained by grievance procedures and by the threat of strikes.
To protect against such incursio n s cqmpanies often required unions to sign collective agreements which contained "managements rights" clauses similar to the general provisions noted atiove in regard to Sweden and Britain.
Moreover union leaders often went on record stating that it was not their intention to usurp the role or responsibility of management. Nevertheless In short, workers' participation in enterprise management in Europe is extensive but shallow; in North America it is restricted but relatively deep.
This pattern has, however, been changing in recent years and work�rs in Europe have, through political means, been acquiring more influence on managerial 22. The AFL-CIO has sup ported numerous legislative initiatives in the general interest of workers. Nenvertheless, in the public mind these statements and activities are eclipsed by t.. he self-serving image which emerges from decentralized collective bargaining.
23 . The explanation for this union strategy, generally held in North America, is that the union movement had no real choice because conditions unique to America precluded the success of the more idealistic, communitarian approach dominant in Europe. The validity of this explanation is not directly relevant to the argument of this paper. Our purpose is to demonstrate . the effects of the choice irregardless of the reasons for it. See Perlman, Selig Helm.
